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Introduction
In the last few years, a broad range of legal scholars, social scientists, 
practitioners, and advocates have drawn increased attention to the use 
of monetary sanctions in the criminal justice system.  Penalties being ex-
amined in this new light include fines, fees, costs, surcharges, and a range 
of other Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs).  Changes in the fiscal and 
policy landscape surrounding the backend of the criminal justice process 
have redefined the role that LFOs play, as well as drawn attention to the 
impact on justice-involved populations, their families, and society.
Some LFOs, especially fines and restitution, can be tied to the de-
terrent, retributive and restorative functions of punishment.  Although 
other LFOs, including fees and costs, contribute to achieving a more 
holistically punitive sanction,1 they are less explicit in their ideological 
justification and, more practically, can be used to generate revenue for 
the operation of core criminal justice functions.2  For the system, an el-
evated dependence on the offender-funded justice model is not without 
broad consequences.  Those in contact with the justice system and their 
families must fund a share of their own criminal processing, putting a 
strain on their already limited resources in many cases.  In the absence 
of robust public funding, some criminal justice agencies have become 
dependent on a revenue stream that can only flow from the combined 
contributions of a substantial population of defendants and supervisees, 
complicating the impact of correctional reform efforts intended to re-
duce these numbers.
Irrespective of their function, the adverse consequences of LFOs 
for defendants are becoming increasingly apparent.  Nonpayment of 
LFO-related debts can lead to serious legal and collateral consequences, 
including revocation of community supervision,3 the loss of voting rights,4 
wage garnishments, loss of a driver’s license, damage to one’s credit, and 
consequently ineligibility for loans and bank accounts.5   Importantly, this 
has effectively created a two-tiered justice system whereby those who 
can afford their financial obligations are able to self-divert away from 
1. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from 
Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 
Am. J. Sociology 1753 (2010).
2. For a review of revenue generation and reliance on fines and fees across U.S. 
states generally, see Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, Governing (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-fines.html [https://
perma.cc/CYW3-65FL].
3. Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as Punishment for 
the Poor (2016); Harris et al., supra note 1.
4. Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 55 
(2019).
5. See also Alicia Bannon et al., Brennan Center for Justice, Criminal Jus-
tice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20A-Barrier-Reentry.
pdf; Karin D. Martin et al., Monetary Sanctions: Legal Financial Obligations in 
US Systems of Justice, 1 Ann. Rev. Criminology 471 (2018).
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these aspects of supervision earlier and subsequently face fewer of these 
longterm collateral consequences.
Against this backdrop, researchers have begun to study the assess-
ment, collection, and consequences of debts related to LFOs.  We write 
as investigators on a project—the Community Corrections Fines and Fees 
Study—tasked with examining the landscape of fines and fees related to 
probation and parole supervision across seven states.6  Below, we first 
provide a succinct review of the limited social scientific literature on 
criminal justice debt and its effects on offenders.  Secondly, we discuss a 
variety of potentially promising avenues for policymakers seeking proac-
tive opportunities to scale back the systematic reliance on, and adverse 
consequences of, financial sanctions.
Two important assumptions underlie our approach to policy and 
practice reforms.  First, we begin with the foundational premise that fines 
and fees should be calibrated according to an individual’s particular 
situation and ability to pay.  In this manner, fines and fees can have a pro-
portionally equivalent effect across people of different financial means; 
the intended impact is preserved while still adjusting for relative wealth. 
Second, we do not directly engage with the arguments for or against the 
abolition of financial sanctions.  We do so for two reasons: (1) this policy 
has been addressed at length elsewhere,7 and (2) we believe that, given 
current legislation, abolitionist policies like those implemented in San 
Francisco and Alameda counties8 will remain out of reach for the major-
ity of jurisdictions for the foreseeable future.  Thus, our emphasis lies in 
setting out actionable policies appropriate for reducing the harms caused 
by LFOs in those jurisdictions with the greatest reliance on fines and fees.
I. Financial Sanctions, Debt, and Their Consequences
Research findings have shown that the application of LFOs has in-
creased on a national scale.9  At the same time, empirical work on debt 
owed by individuals in contact with the justice system has been quite 
limited.  Given this fact, and because LFOs vary meaningfully in purpose, 
size, and source across jurisdictions, many of the figures reported in the 
literature often come from case studies and generalize poorly.  Similarly, 
as the focal point for much of the extant research has been on court-spe-
cific LFOs, very little data exist on the amount of supervision fees owed 
by those under community supervision, despite some recent evidence 
that such supervision fees are ubiquitous and impactful for probationers 
6. Ebony Ruhland et al., Community Corrections Fines and Fees Study, http://ccff-
study.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
7. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary 
Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 505 (2011).
8. See San Francisco County Ordinance No. 131-18: Administrative Code—Crimi-
nal Justice System Fees and Penalties, Fines & Fees Justice Ctr. (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/san-francisco-abolish-criminal- 
justice-fees-penalties [https://perma.cc/Y2W6-Q2JX].
9. Harris et al., supra note 1.
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and parolees.10  For example, in Texas, Reynolds et al. found that individ-
uals released to parole owed between $500 and $2000 in debt related to 
their offense (excluding restitution).11  In another case study in Cambria 
County, Pennsylvania, Alicia Bannon et al. reported on a defendant con-
victed of a drug offense who was assessed $2464.91 in various fees, while 
her punishment also included a $500 fine and restitution totaling $325.12
Though most supervision agencies remain part of the court system, 
there has been an increase in the number of programs and, in some cases, 
entire departments that have been outsourced to for-profit companies. 
The fiscally-oriented focus that underlies the privatization of community 
supervision often exacerbates the issues surrounding LFOs.13   As and 
example, a 2014 Human Rights Watch investigation of probation fees in 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, revealed a situation wherein private 
probation companies were able to profit by tacking on numerous addi-
tional fees, costs, and interest to cases in which probationers could not 
afford to pay court fines and fees upfront.14  For the defendants, this led 
to large debts and extensions of community supervision terms; for the 
companies, this amounted to additional revenue.15
Taken together, these data suggest that LFOs are present across 
the country and they can accumulate into large amounts over the life-
course of community supervision and can confer negative consequences 
in many areas of life.  Beyond case studies, a small handful of quantita-
tive studies have examined amounts of LFOs owed among prisoner and 
probation populations.  Kristofer Bret Bucklen and Gary Zajac showed 
that parolees in Pennsylvania generally owe about $1000, while a sub-
set of parole violators owed approximately $2000, almost double that 
amount.16  Using data from Missouri, Breanne Pleggenkuhle reported an 
average LFO debt of about $1800, largely due to sentencing and post-
conviction fees and costs.17  Nathan Link relied on prison reentry data 
from Ohio, Illinois, and Texas and showed an average of nearly $900 in 
debt, with a wide range of deficits between $10 and $13,000.18  Alexes 
10. Chris Albin-Lackey, Human Rights Watch, Profiting from Probation: Amer-
ica’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry (2014).
11. Carl Reynolds et al., Council of State Governments Justice Center & Tex-
as Office of Court Administration, A Framework to Improve How Fines, 
Fees, Restitution, and Child Support are Assessed and Collected from Peo-
ple Convicted of Crimes (2009).
12. Bannon et al., supra note 5.
13. See Alexes Harris et al., Justice “Cost Points”: Examination of Privatization 
Within Public Systems of Justice, 18 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 343 (2019).
14. Albin-Lackey, supra note 10, at 15.
15. Id.
16. Kristofer Bret Bucklen & Gary Zajac, But Some of Them Don’t Come Back (to 
Prison!): Resource Deprivation and Thinking Errors as Determinants of Parole 
Success and Failure, 89 The Prison J. 239 (2009).
17. Breanne Pleggenkuhle, The Financial Cost of a Criminal Conviction: Context 
and Consequences, 45 Crim. Just. & Behav. 121 (2018).
18. Nathan W. Link, Criminal Justice Debt During the Prisoner Reintegration 
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Harris, Heather Evans, and Katherine Beckett describe the debt burdens 
of felons in Washington State using two different data sources.19  The first 
stemmed from fifty interviews with people who had at least one felony 
living in one of four counties in Washington State.  The second source 
was from official records on the LFOs (including restitution) applied to 
all felony cases in Washington during the first two months of 2004 (N = 
3,366).  Among the interviewees, assessments of LFOs ranged from $500 
to approximately $80,000, with a median of $9091.  Administrative data 
showed wide variation in LFOs, with a minimum of $500 for a single 
felony, to a maximum of $256,257.  The median amount was $1347.  From 
this sample they extracted a random sample of 500 cases to examine how 
these LFOs grow into debt over time.  On average, these 500 individuals 
were assessed $11,471 by the courts, and the average amount still owed 
four years later was $10,840.
Criminal justice and LFO debt can often have a longterm impact, 
influencing the lives of the individuals well past the expiration or com-
pletion of their initial sentence.  Unlike other financial obligations, debts 
related to adjudication and punishment are not subject to relief through 
most traditional mechanisms such as bankruptcy proceedings or other re-
ductive measures, including offsetting the total debt burden by the value 
of surrendered property or services provided.20  As a result, LFO debt can 
reduce access to housing, credit, loans for education and employment, 
or a driver’s license, among others.21  It may also have adverse effects 
on stress, mental health, and family relationships, especially during the 
stressful and tenuous time spent on supervision.22
Carrying LFO debt is not as mundane as an overdue credit card bill. 
Falling behind on payments can often directly lead to increased contact 
with the criminal justice system—such as extensions of the length of time 
on parole or heightened intensity of supervision.23  In some jurisdictions, 
there is a risk of incarceration for nonpayment.24  As such, some argue 
that debt acts as trap, causing people to fall back to prison,25 while others 
Process: Who Has It and How Much? 46 Crim. Just. & Behav. 154 (2019).
19. Harris et al., supra note 1.
20. Beckett & Harris, supra note 7.
21. Bannon et al., supra note 5.
22. Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry 
(2003); Pleggenkuhle, supra note 17; Ebony Ruhland, It’s All About the Money: 
An Exploration of Probation Fees, Corrections (Jan. 8, 2019), https://doi.org/10
.1080/23774657.2018.1564635; Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Facing 
the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry (2005).
23. Shaila Dewan, Private Probation Company Accused of Abuses in Tennessee, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/private- probation-
company-accused-of-abuses-in-tennessee.html [https://perma.cc/ZPP5-4V7Y]; 
Mitali Nagrecha, Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, & Estelle Davis, Center For 
Community Alternatives, When All Else Fails, Fining the Family (2015).
24. Harris et al., supra note 1.
25. Vincent Schiraldi & Michael Jacobson, Could Less Be More When it Comes 
to Probation Supervision?, Am. City & County (June 4, 2014), https://
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suggest that financial sanctions can lead to reincarceration through their 
indirect criminogenic (i.e., crime-causing) effects.26
A more critical group of observers argue that the collateral con-
sequences of LFOs are not in fact collateral; they are instead seen as 
purposefully designed to lead to more entanglement with the justice 
system as there is a revenue-driven incentive to increase the length of 
supervision.27  This perspective suggests that LFOs are not being used 
to meet traditional penological goals but rather to further advance the 
operational and pecuniary needs of the supervision system.  From this 
vantage point, outstanding payments can be seen as an opportunity to 
generate more revenue from late penalties and interest.28  As an exam-
ple, in a scathing report from Louisiana, auditors concluded that revenue 
from fees levied by criminal court judges was not used to fund activities 
related to supervision, but rather to provide the additional revenue need-
ed to pay for a premium health insurance plans for court staff.29  Mary F. 
Katzenstein and Maureen R. Waller surmise that LFOs are another way 
of regulating the poor, which has the effect of indirectly taxing family 
members of the incarcerated—most of whom are women—and limiting 
the upward mobility of the poor.30
In short, existing research suggests there has been a shift toward 
an offender-funded model of community supervision and that, as a re-
sult, justice-related debt burdens are now both large and commonplace. 
Although the amount of empirical research to date has been admittedly 
limited, and causal inference impossible, there is support for the assump-
tion that LFO debts are associated with both immediate and longterm 
www. americancityandcounty.com/2014/06/04/could-less-be-more-when-it-
comes-to-probation-supervision [https://perma.cc/EZ4B-PKRY].
26. Foster Cook, U. Ala. Birmingham Treatment Alternatives for Safer Commu-
nities (UAB TASC), The Burden of Criminal Justice Debt in Alabama: 2014 
Participant Self-Report Survey (2014); Alex R. Piquero & Wesley G. Jennings, 
Justice System-Imposed Financial Penalties Increase the Likelihood of Recidi-
vism in a Sample of Adolescent Offenders, 15 Youth Violence & Juv. Just. 325 
(2016); Ruhland, supra note 22; Nathan W. Link & Caterina G. Roman, Longitu-
dinal Associations Among Child Support Debt, Employment, and Recidivism Af-
ter Prison, 58 Soc. Quarterly 140 (2017).
27. Albin-Lackey, supra note 10; Ken Armstrong, The Woman Who Spent Six Years 
Fighting a Traffic Stop, The Marshall Project (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/10/the-woman-who-spent-six-years- 
fighting-a-traffic-stop [https://perma.cc/5QSX-LZNK]; Dewan, supra note 23; 
Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 1175 (2014); Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Maureen R. Waller, Taxing the 
Poor: Incarceration, Poverty Governance, and the Seizure of Family Resources, 
13 Persps. on Pol. 638 (2015).
28. Albin-Lackey, supra note 10; Armstrong, supra note 27.
29. Campbell Robertson, Suit Alleges ‘Scheme’ in Criminal Costs Borne by New Or-
leans’s Poor, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/us/
suit-alleges-scheme-in-criminal-costs-borne-by-new-orleanss-poor.html [https://
perma.cc/R5FR-MGTF].
30. Katzenstein & Waller, supra note 27.
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consequences for those in contact with justice agencies and their social 
support networks.
II. Where Do We Go from Here?
There is a significant need for descriptive and inferential empirical 
scholarship on the practices of assessing and collecting fines and fees and 
their impacts on people before a truly evidence-based strategy can be 
developed.  However, recognizing the clear challenges today, there are 
several promising opportunities that may mitigate the excessive financial 
burden of LFOs and potentially reduce the scope or impact of the asso-
ciated collateral consequences.  Below, we outline several areas in which 
reform-oriented decisionmakers could experiment to more closely tailor 
LFOs to recognize the individual needs of justice-involved individuals 
and their families.
A. Legislatures and Courts
The administrative and policy issues surrounding LFOs are com-
plex.  Although community corrections agencies are often responsible 
for collecting fees and fines and considerable negative attention has been 
directed at them, some of it may be misdirected.  On a fundamental level, 
the existence of many community supervision fees results from the fact 
that criminal justice agencies at the state, county, and local levels are not 
properly funded by the legislature, counties, and/or cities.  For example, 
Bannon et al. provided an example of case docket from Cambria county, 
Pennsylvania, where a host of user fees, such as transportation and ser-
vice charges, are required by those who pass through that court system.31 
Public officials, including legislators at multiple levels of government, often es-
tablish the fines and fees that the courts or agencies are then required to 
assess.32  This funding system limits officers’ discretion to scale back the 
size of financial sanctions in any particular case, irrespective of indigen-
cy or need, and policies in some jurisdictions may even require them to 
sanction for payment noncompliance.
Where fees and other LFOs are employed to supplement, or even 
necessary to balance, community supervision budgets, legislators must 
step in and provide the necessary financial support.  Although it may be 
politically challenging to divert the necessary revenue to fund probation 
and parole, some options should be seriously considered.  There will be 
difficult choices made, including identifying the programs and operations 
that may receive less money, in order to offset the proportion of current 
budgets supported with revenue from LFOs.  Absent such increases, the 
unfunded mandates passed down to probation and parole will inevitably 
lead to a continued or escalating reliance on fees and costs.
The legislative landscape for LFOs should also be reconsidered.  It 
may be possible to redraft the enabling statutes and ordinances to reduce 
31. Bannon et al., supra note 5, at 8.
32. Harris et al., supra note 1.
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their disparate and unintended impact.  Legislators should first take an 
inventory of all existing legislation that requires fees and costs to be as-
sessed against those under criminal justice supervision.  At present, the 
scale of required fees and costs is likely both massive and unknown.  As 
an example, legislatures should consider what Wayne A. Logan and Ron-
ald F. Wright term “LFO Commissions”—groups of policymakers tasked 
with evaluating the potential impact of any proposed financial sanction 
in the context of the financial sanctions that already exist.33  This work 
should additionally be predicated by a complete descriptive inventory 
of costs, payment strategies, usage, and outcomes.  The resulting LFO 
Index should be made public to provide transparency and educate the 
public about this important but misunderstood issue.  These responsibil-
ities could be part of sentencing commissions already established, run by 
legislative committees, or under the authority of another public agency.
LFO Commissions and LFO Indexes could be used to encourage 
consistency and transparency in setting LFOs among the community su-
pervision population.  For example, based on these data, commissions 
could recommend increased flexibility for fees associated with communi-
ty supervision.  These ranges could be based on reasonable costs directly 
attributable to the expenses of the supervision process, with assessments 
within the range made based on the individual’s actual ability to pay.  If 
a sentencing commission were to be given this responsibility, they could 
also revisit criminal sanctions and recommend the wider ranges (i.e., a 
lower floor) for fines for any given crime.  This subsequently could allow 
judges to more comfortably (and within guideline recommendations) 
consider individual characteristics and would empower them to reduce 
the amount of the financial sanction in certain cases.
Legislatures and courts should reconsider the nature of the LFOs 
that they either recommend generally or assess in specific cases.  Pro-
bation and parole officers are often criticized for onerous supervision 
conditions that can lead to violations and reincarcerations.  While there 
are some jurisdictions in which probation officers have significant discre-
tion regarding the application of stricter conditions and violations,34 it is 
often the policies set by the legislature, courts, and other upstream discre-
tionary decisionmakers (e.g., parole boards) who more directly set LFO 
related policies.  Therefore, these recommendations should take into ac-
count the impact of LFOs on individuals and in the variation in ability 
to pay.  Instead of a fee being set at a flat amount, for example, policy 
guidelines could recommend—or even require—amounts that were set 
proportional to an individual’s income (e.g., 5 percent of monthly wages) 
or that payment was contingent on nonindigent status.  This would ex-
pand the range of options available to probation officers who collect 
33. Logan & Wright, supra note 27.
34. Ebony Ruhland, Social Worker, Law Enforcer, and now Bill Collector: Proba-
tion Officers’ Collection of Supervision Fees, 59 J. Offender Rehabilitation 44 
(2020).
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LFOs, irrespective of the amount of discretion they have and ensure that 
individuals could remain in compliance with court ordered LFOs while, 
at the same time, building in a safety valve such that the unintended fiscal 
and criminal justice consequences for nonpayment in the face of poverty 
are avoided.
Legislatures can, and should, act to limit the impact of LFO debt 
on an individual’s ability to complete community supervision when there 
are no other outstanding issues.  Revocations, supervision extensions, and 
incarceration exclusively for nonpayment could be legislatively prohib-
ited.35  Similarly, suspension of driving and other privileges as secondary 
punishments clearly inhibit supervision goals such as securing employ-
ment and attending treatment, making repayment even less likely.  These 
should be prohibited or, at a minimum, strict, nondiscretionary precon-
ditions for their usage (e.g., extreme noncompliance) set at the policy 
level.  Lastly, given the documented problems with financial incentives 
inherent in for-profit supervision,36 legislatures could ban the use of pri-
vate probation companies, as some have recommended,37 or they might 
prohibit the retention of fees as part of the financial agreement with such 
agencies, making at least that aspect of privatization revenue neutral for 
the company.
Finally, government should begin to publicly reexamine this entire 
area of criminal justice policy and consider completely decoupling crim-
inal justice debt servicing from community supervision agencies through 
legislation.  Hearings should be held to discuss community corrections 
officers’ roles, and ensure, as we suggest, that officers’ tasks are focused 
on the correctional goals of rehabilitation and public safety.  Public in-
quiries, perhaps run by independent academics or subject matter experts, 
should be data-driven and directly support jurisdiction-specific research. 
Through this mechanism, the opportunity to shift monitoring of debt 
repayment to a noncriminal justice arm of the government can be ex-
plored.38  Under this model, LFOs can be dealt with similarly to how 
other debts to the government are handled, akin to wage garnishment 
and liens for people with outstanding taxes who can afford to pay but are 
willfully choosing not to.  Importantly, though it may be an improvement 
over the status quo with regard to public agencies, care should be taken 
with the use of private, third-party collections companies to monitor 
debt given the profit motive inherent in privatization; money collected to 
service LFO debts should never directly become profits for a company. 
35. See Sharon Brett & Mitali Nagrecha, Criminal Justice Policy Program at 
Harvard Law School, Proportionate Financial Sanctions: Policy Prescrip-
tions for Reform (2019).
36. Albin-Lackey, supra note 10; Harris et al., supra note 13.
37. Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 35; Abby Shafroth, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., 
Criminal Justice Debt in the South: A Primer for the Southern Partnership 
to Reduce Debt (2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/white-
paper-criminal-justice-debt-in-the-south-dec2018.pdf.
38. Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 35.
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As a collateral benefit, separating debt monitoring and law enforcement 
roles may free up criminal justice system resources that can be focused 
on addressing pressing crime and safety issues,39 avoid increasing prison 
populations with debtors, and allow probation and parole agencies and 
agents to return to their core functions as correctional officers and not 
debt collectors.
B. Community Corrections Agencies
On the ground, probation and parole departments are often re-
sponsible for the collection of legislative and judicial fines and fees, as 
well as for setting and collecting a range of fees associated with their 
own community supervision process.  Many probation and parole de-
partments may be logistically ill-equipped to monitor and enforce 
these monetary sanctions as officers already may be overburdened with 
fieldwork, court appearances, and writing case notes.40  Moreover, the tra-
ditional supervision remedy for addressing LFO noncompliance is often 
the same as the punitive remedy for delinquency and offending, name-
ly, sanctions, violations, and in some cases reincarceration.  For example, 
the same administrative responses are often available for both a parolee 
who has willfully missed several appointments and one who cannot meet 
the payment obligations of their LFOs.  This approach is arguably an 
inappropriate response for debt nonpayment generally, and certainly in 
the case of the person who simply cannot afford to pay.  Agencies can, 
however, mitigate some adverse consequences by using their currently 
available discretion in several key ways: (1) changing how fees are ap-
plied; (2) rethinking the responses that probation and parole have in the 
case of nonpayment; and (3) addressing ways to make supervision less 
costly (and passing that savings down to the supervised population).
First, agencies can rethink how and when fees are applied during 
supervision.  Some fees could be eliminated altogether as they are not 
appropriate revenue-producing vehicles for agencies and municipal gov-
ernments.41  For the fees that are directly related to the administration 
of supervision, cannot be reasonably eliminated, or are otherwise con-
sidered essential, agencies can expand the use of waivers or downward 
adjustments on a case by case basis.  While many agencies choose to ad-
dress this informally as part of the officer-supervisee relationship, which 
is a positive step, this creates an opportunity for the unequal allocation of 
waivers (for example, between lenient and strict officers) and for a high 
degree of variation between jurisdictions.  Instead, structured and stan-
dardized assessment instruments could be developed and implemented 
to assess individual need, ability to pay, and the nature of the outstanding 
39. See Rebecca Goldstein et al., Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement, and the 
Quality of Government Service, 56 Urban Aff. Rev. 5 (2018).
40. Kathryn D. Morgan, Officer Attitudes About Supervision Fee Collection in Ala-
bama, 59 Fed. Prob. 62, 64 (1995).
41. Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 35.
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obligations (for example, restitution to a victim or court costs).  This 
process could be implemented at the outset of the supervision case and 
reassessed at least annually or as financial situations change such that the 
need for a waiver, or an adjustment to an accelerated payment plan, was 
appropriate.  Recognizing the complex social and financial environments 
for many justice-involved individuals, such instruments could take into 
account verifiable information on health issues, transportation, and cost 
of living, in addition to employment and family responsibilities.
Alternatively, probation and parole agencies could adopt a general 
ability-to-pay model for the specific fees they assess.  Employed most 
commonly within the court system and popular in parts of Europe,42 this 
approach sets fees and fines in an individualized manner and such that 
those who earn higher incomes or have greater personal resources pay 
more than individuals who lack financial resources.43  This approach en-
sures that the purposes of punishment (or even, arguably, the need to 
support the functioning of supervision systems) are met while also taking 
into account the relative impact of an LFO and the likelihood of that 
debt being paid.  Individually calibrating how a probationer or parolee 
pays in a structured manner could also have the additional benefit of 
improving perceptions of justice system legitimacy.  While there may be 
some difficulties in terms of assessing who has the ability to pay,44 there 
is also some evidence that people are generally honest when asked about 
their incomes.45
Second, probation and parole agencies, in consultation with the 
courts who oversee them, should reassess the costs and benefits of using 
coercive powers (e.g., violations) in the face of unpaid monetary sanc-
tions.  Such punishments have a demonstrated and adverse impact on 
42. Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay More?, 11 
Rev. L. &  Econ. 481 (2015).
43. Both agencies and researchers may need legal guidance on how to define ability 
to pay.  For example, in their New Jersey study examining the effect of threats of 
incarceration for nonpayment, Weisburd, Einat, and Kowalski write: ”As a first 
indicator of ‘ability to work’ (and thus ability to pay the court-ordered financial 
obligation), the [Administrative Office of the Courts] used a simple criterion of 
some prior work history.”  David Weisburd, Tomer Einat & Matt Kowalski, The 
Miracle of Cells: An Experimental Study of Interventions to Increase Payment of 
Court-Ordered Financial Obligations, 7 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 9, 16 (2008) 
(emphasis added).  Clearly, “some prior work history” constitutes an insufficient 
assessment of ability to pay and as such may represent a violation of Bearden v. 
Georgia’s prohibition on the incarceration of people who truly cannot afford to 
pay.  See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
44. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Punishment Regime, 10 
Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 555 (2011).
45. Sally Hillsman & Judith A. Greene, The Use of Fines as an Intermediate Sanc-
tion, in Smart Sentencing: The Emergence of Intermediate Sanctioning 123 
(James M. Byrne et al. eds., 1992); see generally Beth A. Colgan, Addressing Mod-
ern Debtors’ Prisons with Graduated Economic Sanctions that Depend on Abil-
ity to Pay 23–24 (Hamilton Project Policy Proposal No. 2019-04, 2019), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Colgan_PP_201903014.pdf.
210 2020:199C J LR
the people subject to them.  However, even where there is little concern 
for the probationer and the collateral consequences he or she may ex-
perience, these punitive levers are likely penny-wise and pound-foolish 
practices.  A violation hearing is likely to be, and even just a few days of 
incarceration are certain to be, more costly from a systemic perspective 
than the vast majority of LFO debts.  While collecting financial penalties 
is important, it is worth examining if the criminal justice system should 
operate at a loss to do so.
To be clear, the empirical research literature is undeveloped to the 
extent that the ideal alternatives for the probationer or parolee delin-
quent on fines and fees remains unclear.  There is very little research 
that shows the necessary causal relationships between individual LFO 
types and negative outcomes, even as the body of descriptive literature 
begins to grow.  As we have suggested above, reducing debts and remov-
ing debt monitoring from law enforcement altogether may be promising 
approaches.
Until that happens, shifting probationers who owe debt from crim-
inal to administrative caseloads that do not rely on punitive levers and 
have less onerous or no reporting requirements is an alternative worthy 
of study.  Another possibility is referring cases to third-party civil debt 
collectors who can manage debt compliance.  On one hand, this practice 
has known problems as it creates a new set of barriers, such as further 
credit damagefor people who are poor.  In addition, as a result of the 
profit motivation intrinsic to third-party collections, service fees can pile 
up on top of what may already be an unwieldy sum of money.46  On the 
other hand, the actual effects of implementing this counterfactual on a 
broad scale are largely unknown.  Some evidence suggests that civil debt 
collection may be the lesser of two evils in comparison to the current 
response which involves criminal justice levers such as violation, exten-
sion of supervision, and incarceration for nonpayment/violation.47  Care 
should be taken to avoid significantly increasing the burden of LFOs to 
cover costs associated with collections, as this creates a feedback loop of 
financial penalties that can be even more difficult to end.
Lastly, agencies may strive to be more efficient and reduce their 
overall budgetary needs.  For example, risk-stratified supervision allows 
fewer officers to supervise more low-risk probationers (and at a lower 
cost) without decreasing public safety.48  Other low-risk offenders may 
46. See Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 35.
47. However, there are cases where civil debtors have been redirected to the crim-
inal justice system and then incarceration, although we do not have a strong 
sense of where and how often this occurs.  See Lizzie Presser, When Medical 
Debt Collectors Decide Who Gets Arrested, ProPublica (Oct. 16, 2019), https://
features.propublica.org/medical-debt/when-medical-debt-collectors- decide-
who-gets-arrested-coffeyville-kansas [https://perma.cc/CR57-79ET]. 
48. Geoffrey C. Barnes et al., The Effects of Low-Intensity Supervision for 
 Lower-Risk Probationers: Updated Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 
35 J. Crime & Just. 200 (2012).
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be diverted away from active supervision.49  Alternative forms of less 
resource-intensive supervision strategies, such as electronic home moni-
toring, GPS monitoring, or kiosk reporting may also be useful in reducing 
overhead expenses, though further exploration is needed as costs are 
often associated with these devices, many of which have already been 
passed down to probationers as fees in some jurisdictions.50
Todd Jermstad recently alluded to several potential improvements 
that may also decrease operational dependence on fees.51  He suggests 
that equipping officers with tablets so that notes can be immediately en-
tered into databases would obviate the need for officers to return to the 
office and enter case notes for hours.  In addition, communication social 
media applications and text messaging can improve communication and 
minimize the amount of time it takes for officers to locate people they 
oversee.  Although these improvements are worth of exploring and may 
both decrease expenses and provide other supervision benefits, it remains 
unclear to what extent these strategies are able to address more funda-
mental issues of underfunding.  Should this angle be pursued, it would be 
critical that alternative sources of funding are identified to pay for these 
technological advancements to preclude the need for yet another opera-
tional fee.  Perhaps most importantly, it must be ensured that any savings 
realized through these strategies are used to offset reliance on LFO rev-
enue and not to support new programming that requires further revenue.
Conclusion
LFO obligations and the consequences for not meeting them are in-
creasingly recognized as a driving factor in both collateral consequences 
for probationers and parolees and fiscal support for correctional and judi-
cial agencies.  There are many empirical questions currently unaddressed 
within the literature surrounding LFOs.  These data are necessary to in-
form and define policy and practice reform on fines, fees, and associated 
debt.  However, there is a growing scholarly (and societal) consensus that 
the current system of financial sanctions is untenable and that we should 
reduce both debt amounts and their legal and collateral consequences.
In the above Parts, we have suggested alterations and reforms at 
both the legislative and agency level that may limit fees and their adverse 
consequences on individuals and families.  While perhaps not the final 
step for reform in this area, these actionable recommendations would 
serve to increase transparency regarding LFOs, create a framework 
for more comprehensive analysis of fees and fines, and rebalance the 
49. Faith E. Lutze et al., The Future of Community Corrections Is Now: Stop Dream-
ing and Take Action, 28 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 42 (2012).
50. Erin L. Bauer et al., Kiosk Supervision: A Guidebook for Community Correc-
tions Professionals, Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Serv. (Westat) No. 250174 
(Dec. 2015).
51. Todd Jermstad, Inherently Unstable: The History and Future of Reliance on 
Court-Imposed Fees in the State of Texas, 83 Fed. Prob. 50 (2019).
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allocation of LFO related revenue such that the burden of correctional 
funding, even in part, does not fall on justice-involved individuals.  In turn, 
conscientious implementation of these suggested practices may serve as 
a foundation for developing broader, more holistic, and evidence-based 
reforms focused on reducing the assignment and the impact of LFOs on 
justice-involved individuals.
